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Collective Memory
and World War II
in America
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one considers the current metaphorical "war on terror,"
in which the entire world is the "front line," as equivalent
to what have previously been considered wars. If one
includes the entire scope of human activity associated
with modern warfare, of course, including mobilization
for war at home, more Americans have direct memories.
Yet, few have the firsthand, visceral knowledge of war
in all its ramifications, including combat. With the
technological advances in weaponry that the United
States military has used so effectively in recent years,it
may be that in the future fewer and fewer Americans
will gain firsthand knowledge of direct ground combat.
There is perhaps a danger in this fact, for, although a
lack of firsthand knowledge does not preclude some
knowledge of war, personal testimony of veterans seems
vital to a full and vivid understanding of modern warfare. When it comes to something so destructive, we
are loath to lose the personal testimony to its horror
contained in personal memories .When those memorybearers die, all that we will have are history books and
the various other media by which we gain knowledge
of the past-books, movies, monuments, photographs,
paintings, and oral tradition. Together these create a
collective memory, and it is from this memory that the
lessons of war will be learned.
Perhaps this general role of memory is part of
the reason for Americans' extraordinarily high level
of recent interest in World War II. There has been a
spate of public remembrance of this war, from major
motion pictures, such as Stephen Spielberg's Saving
Private Ryan, to a television series, Band of Brothers

on HBO, to the continuing popularity of war-related
memoirs and histories (including such coffee-table
books as Tom Brokaw's The Greatest Generation), and
to the new National D-Day Museum in New Orleans,
and, more notably, a projected new memorial on the
Mallin Washington, D.C. 1 Americans realize that the
generation having direct memories of the war is passing. It is time to honor them, but also time to get the
record straight.
Getting the record straight is no simple task, however,as scholars in the new field of "memory studies"
suggest. Working in a variety of disciplines, these
scholarstake as their subject the creation of collective,
or cultural, memory. At the heart of their concerns is
the powerful hold that memory, as opposed to history,
has on human beings and the way in which humans
construct collective memories. Because memory has
suchpower, both on a personal and social level, scholars
havebeen intensely interested in just how memories are
created and what purposes they may be made to serve.
Cultural memories impose lessons and embody moral
evaluations.For example, Americans tend to remember
World War II, nostalgically, as a "Good War." As with
most cultural memories, the memory of World War II
does powerful work, embedding individual stories of
heroism,suffering, and sacrifice in a larger story about
the virtuous role and conduct of the United States .
World War II was good because moral and because it
wasan American triumph. This is a sound and legitimate
meaningto the war, but it is not the only meaning men
and women have ascribed to the war, and the memory
ofthe "Good War" need not, and perhaps should not, be
the only memory of it. This may be to suggest that collectivememory should be complex rather than simple,
ironicrather than nostalgic, and variegated rather than
homogenous. But it might also simply suggest a critical attitude toward collective memory, an awareness of
the multiplicity of memories and meanings inevitably
excludedfrom the dominant memory of an event, and a
willingnessto return to the past and recover the forgotten and overlooked memories and to contemplate the
alternativemoral meanings they suggest.
The field of "memory studies" has grown trementously in_the last twenty years, and "memory," as Kerwin
ee Klem reports, has become the leading term in

cultural history. 2 Memory studies is
truly interdisciplinary, integrating
scholarship from fields as diverse as
psychology, sociology, anthropology,
art history, literature, and communications as well as history; Americans
have been active in it, but pioneering
work has emerged in France, Great
Britain, Israel, and Germany as well
as other nations. 3 Major early studies
included Yosef Yerushalmi's Zakhor:
Jewish History and Jewish Memory,
published in 1982, which suggested
that the emergence of a historical
consciousness among Jews in the
nineteenth century created a crisis of
meaning and identity for them, and a
multi-volume collection of essays on
French sites of remembrance edited
by Pierre Nora, which appeared in
the 1980s and 1990s.4 The concept of
"collective memory" shapes the field.
First systematically formulated by
the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in 1925,the idea of"collective
memory" carries the suggestion that
memory is not located exclusively in
the mind. Rather, individual memories are structured by social relations
and exist, in a sense, in the dialogue
between human beings and the
structures imbued with mnemonic
purpose that humans create. Collective memory is, in Alon Confino's
definition, "what a social group,
be it a family, a class, or a nation,
remembers of the past"; it is a "social
reality transmitted and sustained
through the conscious efforts of a
social group." 5 By 1989, the new field
reached critical mass. Randolph Starn
and Natalie Zemon Davis edited an
issue of Representations entitled
"Memory and Counter-Memory,"
which featured the publication of a
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seminal essay by Nora in translation. That same year a
new journal, History and Memory: Studies in Representations of the Past, based in Tel Aviv and Los Angeles,
began publication, and the Journal ofAmerican History
published a special issue on the topic of memory and
American history. 6
The power of the concept of collective memory
lies in its ability to allow scholars from differing disciplines and ideological perspectives to speak together
about rather fundamental questions: How does the
individual attain "identity"? What is the effect of traumatic events-for example, mass genocide or modern,
industrialized warfare-on the individual? How has the
state effectively fostered popular national identities? The
study of memory enables scholars to bridge the divide
between the individual and the larger society by postulating memory to be, even in its common individualized
and psychological sense, a social construction .7 It is no
surprise that the field of"memory studies" has emerged
so quickly and dramatically in the last twenty years.
Even a relatively brief engagement with the literature of memory studies reveals an important conceptual
problem: Not all agree on the definition of collective
memory, even as all see the social inscription of memory
as the central problematic of their field. Some more
theoretically informed work in this field suggests that
collective memory is a complex social-psychological
phenomenon.Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan outline
a conception of collective memory rooted in an analysis
of the cognitive features of the mind. Physiologically,
what we think of as memory consists of"memory traces"
that are layered in our minds; collective memory occurs
when a group of people who share memory traces discuss them with one another. 8 "Collective memory,"
they suggest, describes the product of these collective
remembrances and does not exist apart from these
individuals. When they die, these collective memories die. What we define as memory is, in some sense,
collective. Any monument or ceremony that reflects
this group's memories would simply be that, a monument or ceremony to which later generations ascribe a
memory but not necessarily the same memory as those
who created it. 9 ln other words, some scholars seek to
merge a psychological and sociological understanding
of memory-suggesting that the field of memory stud-

ies is vitally concerned with the actual, physiological
construction of memories. Other scholars of memory
have assumed the task of analyzing how people have
remembered over time, recounting the arts of memory
practiced from antiquity through the Renaissance. 10
Still other scholars treat collective memory as simply
the broad, cultural understanding of the past. In this
sense, we might consider memory as being buildings
and monuments-actual
material objects-as Michael
Schudson suggests. 11 Or, as Michael Kammen suggests,
collective memory is the sum of socially constructed representations of the past-the "publicly presented past : in
speeches and sermons, editorials and school textbooks,
museum exhibitions, historic sites, and widely noticed
historical art,ranging from oil paintings to public sculpture and commemorative monuments ."12
Behind each of these attempts at definition, however,
is the sense that collective memory is distinct from history as generally conceived. Large differences remain:
In Kammen's formulation, much that is history-for
example, textbooks-feeds a society's collective sense
of history . Pierre Nora, however, posits a sharper divide
between a consciously constructed representation of
the past and collective memory as such. Nora argues
that people in modern society use memory differently
than those in premodern societies. Memory characterizes people in the past, Nora declared. In primitive
societies, people possessed "an integrated memory, allpowerful, sweeping, un-self-conscious, and inherently
present-minded." "Memory," for Nora, is alive, of the
present, vulnerable to manipulation based on current
emotional needs, sacred; "history" is analytical and
non-religious, the reconstruction or representation of
the past. Memory "welds together" the group; history
does not, belonging to everyone and no one .13We live
in an age in which history has usurped memory, Nora
suggests; the forces of modernization and globalization,
of democratization and mass culture, have eroded the
kinds of cultures that knit people together. In older
cultures, memory was passed from one generation
to another, person to person .14 "Societies based on
memory are no more: the institutions that once transmitted values from generation to generation-churches,
schools, families, governments-have
ceased to function as they once did." Historiography, in Nora's vivid

image, "runs the blade of a knife
between the heartwood of memory
and the bark of history." As a result,
memory is now relegated to particular social and cultural sites-lieux
de mimoire-monuments,
textbooks, religious books, tombs, flags,
veterans' groups, commemorative
moments being examples-spaces in
daily life, whether vestiges or recent
constructions, which lie "between
memory and history." It is to these
sites that modern French men and
women must resort to create their
individualized sense of themselves.
Once, the French were people of
memory, bound to the nation by
their very beings, their connection
to the soil. Now, they must resort to
lieux de mimoire to obtain this bond.
Memory, once thought of as "rooted
in the soil," is now seen as "something
central to individual identity." "This
transformation of memory marks a
decisive shift from the historical to
the psychological, from the social
to the individual, from the concrete
message to its subjective representation,from repetition to remembrance .
Memory became a private affair. As
a result of this psychologization, the
self now stands in a new relation to
memory and the past." 15 Individual
memory-and
history-superseded
collective memory . Nora's claims are
echoed by other scholars. ''A key point
in many histories of memory," write
Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins in
their review of the literature, "is that
a significant transformation in the
experience of time occurred at some
debatable point between the Middle
Ages and the nineteenth century.
Many authors describe an existential
crisis arising out of the increased
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possibility for abstract thought[,] ... out of accelerating
change resulting from increased industrialization and
urbanization, as well as out of the resultant decline of
religious worldviews and of traditional forms of political authority.''16
In modern society, then, much is at stake in the construction of collective memory and lieux de mimoire.
Many historians of collective memory conceive it in
terms more akin to Kamm en than Nora, that is, as
the product of various socially constructed forms of
remembrance. For these historians, socially constructed
collective memory is potentially a means by which to
de - center conventional nation - centered historical
narratives, to shift the authority to interpret history
from professional historians to the people broadly
conceived, and to infuse the past with spiritual, even
sacred, associations. In being attentive to the ways
in which collective memory is created, historians
have often turned to the memories and narratives of
traditionally marginalized historical groups - women
and ethnic and racial minorities. The recovery of their
"agency" in creating an alternative, or non - official,
memory of the past is a return of the repressed, so to
speak. The historical construction of such alternative
memories, many scholars of collective memory would
argue, is inherently subversive and disruptive in that it
entails disrupting the "imagined" historical narratives of
nationalist ideologies. 17 Professional historians, in this
view, were the handmaidens of nationalizing elites.John
Bodnar distinguishes between "official"and "vernacular"
memories: 1he official memory serves to legitimize the
power of the state; various vernacular voices challenge
such legitimations. 18 John R. Gillis identifies what he
considers an emerging "post -national" era in memorymaking, in which the state is no longer hegemonic . He
sees this as a cultural shift comparable in some ways to
that fostered by the Protestant Reformation. People are
taking historical authority from the experts and specialists. "For those who regard the national 'heritage' as a
sacred text, the democratization of memory is equivalent
to profanation, or, what is worse, cultural suicide ."1his
process may well lead simply to the privat ization of
memory but, in any case, Gillis argues, the nationalist
tradition of memory-making is coming to an end: "We
have no alternative but to construct new memories as

well as new identities better suited to the complexities lective memory as a major avenue to
of a post-national era." 19
power. Controlling memory is a very
David Thelen and Roy Rosenzweig, in 7he Presence of effective way by which to legitimate
the Past: Popular Uses ofHistory in American Life (1998), authority, move public opinion, shape
a study of popular historical consciousness rooted in popular values.
an ambitious telephone survey of average Americans,
It is difficult to situate the domidevelop the notion of popular historymaking, in which nant American memory of World
they include such things as taking and saving photoWar II-as the "Good War" - in the
graphs, blurring the boundaries between memory and schema developed by memory scholhistory significantly. The past is most relevant to people ars. It is undoubtedly the product of
when put to personal use, they argue; fami lies want to "official" historymakers, embedded
know where they came from and whether inherited
in political speeches and governdiseases lurk in their past. They concluded that ordinary ment monuments, but it is also the
Americans had little interest in textbook and classroom product of thousands of "vernacular"
accounts of history; what they care about is the past memories . The war was good in sevinterpreted in intimate terms-related to their personal eral ways for most Americans. The
lives or the lives of friends and family.2°Collective his- goal of defeating fascist totalitariantorymaking, in these terms, can tend toward therapeutic
ism now seems self-evidently right
aims. Thus, the memory of the Vietnam War in the and just. The Holocaust looms as one
United States is impressively solipsistic: Americans
of the most tragic acts of barbarity in
remember this ignominious military and political defeat human history, Adolph Hitler as the
in terms of the damage inflicted on themselves, particumost oppressive of authoritarian leadlarly the wounds and scars remaining on the bodies and ers. Moreover, Americans remember
in the minds of Vietnam veterans. Paradoxically, the the war as a time of national unity and
relentless revisiting of the still-open wound allows for public spiritedness . In our contempo healing in the American body politic. 21
rary period of deep cultural division
At root in this scholarly debate is the tantalizing
and discord, the era of World War
notion that collective memory represents a more socially II appears relatively harmonious. In
compelling mode of knowing the past, and therefore a part this is due to nostalgia-the real
more efficacious kind of history-making. Underlying
divisions of that era are remembered
this new field are two key questions: How do we use the less than the instances of unity. In
past? And, how should we know the past? The two are part, the nation was, indeed, more
actually related: How we know the past conditions how ordered, its popular culture more
we use it, or how we think to use it. The central discovery monochromatic, not only due to the
black-and-white films and newsreels
of memory scholars is that "collective memory," whatever it is, is a distinct way of knowing the past-that is, of the time but also due to the then
it is somehow different from what we normally mean unquestioned hegemony of white
by the phrase "history" (a formal record, or chronicle, of Americans . Finally, for Americans
on the homefront, the war was a
the past, created by experts and therefore "true"because
based on authoritative sources) . Collective memory is period of economic prosperity and
organic and popular, thus having more of what the safety. Yes, 15 million men and several
sociologist Philip Rieff called "binding address" upon hundred thousand women joined the
a people .22 Collective memory somehow gets to the armed services or women's auxiliaries
heart of who we are, our identity, in a way that history
(over 18 percent of American families
does not . Thus, these scholars see the control of col- contributed at least one member to
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the armed services), yet neither Germany or Japan were
able to attack the North American mainland in any
significantway. 23 There was some rationing, but for most
Americans, the war was a time of work re-gaine d. After
a decade of economic depression, the war rekindled
American purpose and self-confidence. Goods such as
tin, paper, rubber, and nylon were rationed; meat, coffee,
and butter were in short supply; and the production of
automobiles for private use ended. Yet, thousands of
well-stocked supermarkets opened, millions of businesses began, and Americans purchased books, records,
cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and jewelry as never before.
Between 1940 and 1944, civilian purchases of goods
and services increased 12% in the United States, a feat
matched by no other major power during the war.24
This image of the "Good War" co-exists with the
heroic remembrance of the war- the memory preserved
in war movies made during the war and since, which
featured self-sacrificing heroes, ethnically diverse but
harmonious platoons of good-spirited American boys,
and sometimes neat and antiseptic battlefield deaths.
In The End oJVictory Culture: Cold WarAmerica and the
Disillusioning of a Generation (1995), Tom Engelhardt
analyzes what he considers the American "war story,"
a story that became increasingly untenable after World
War II. It was really a story about the nation and who
Americans are, and it most notably revolved around
American settlers confronting savage Indians. The good
guys fought the savages, often as a small force facing
overwhelming odds, and by defeating them evidenced
their moral sanctification. Victory in warfare vindicated
the virtue of the United States and its values of democracy and freedom. For Engell1ardt, the emergence of the
United States as a supreme military superpower often
pursuing morally ambiguous wars, overtly and covertly,
in the Cold War era, nullified this American mythos.
Nevertheless, he recounts the way in which the heroic
memory ofWorld War II was created in the late 1940s
and 1950s.American television viewers imbibed a steady
series of quasi-official,war-related documentaries, often
created from Defense Department film footage. Victory
at Sea, a popular series on the U.S. Navy's experience in
the war, played for 26 Sunday afternoons in 1952-1953
between 3:00 and 3:30 pm. Scored by Richard Rodgers,
the documentary featured narration such as the fol-

lowing: "From island to island, continent to continent,
the children of free peoples move the forces of tyranny
from the face of the earth ... it is, it will be so, until the
forces of tyranny are no more." 25 Crusade in Europe and
Crusade in the Pacifi,cpreceded Victory at Sea; Air Power
succeeded it. Military themed dramatic and comedy
series were also on television, and the Army also sponsored such programs as Talent Patrol, which drew upon
servicemen and servicewomen, and 7he Big Picture, a
regular report from the Army. As a youth, Engelhardt
avidly consumed war movies and war comic books and
played with toy soldiers.26 He recalled playing war games
in his new Long Island housing development:
My friend and I crouch down, furrowed dirt and
leafy potato plants as far as the eye can see. The
two of us scan the horizon . Somewhere out there
the enemy is approaching-not the one in Korea,
but a real enemy, the Japs or Nazis ("Japanazis,"
as World War II comic books sometimes called
them) or maybe the Indians. The choice is ours. No
parents are nearby to tell us what to do, no teachers
to instruct us, and we're armed. I grip a stick ....
"Watch out!" my friend
shouts as loud as he wants, because no one cares
that we and the invisible but palpable enemy are
here at war in these fields. Yes, I notice it now,
too: the faint motion ofleaves that might pass for
the wind. It's them! A banzai charge! We leap up,
firing madly, but with deadly accuracy.The enemy
begins to fall.27
Reduced to the terms of a children's game, the collective memory of World War II seems necessarily
simplistic. But the child's memory informs the adult
understanding. In the end, how different is the child ish reenactment of conflict in a potato field from the
celluloid reenactments filmed for adult consumption?
Even if motion pictures-or novels or works of artre-create the actual horror of combat, with exploding
bodies and spurting wounds, the suffering and trauma
of war is often embedded in a narrative as simp le as
that contrived by the children. Good over bad, heroism
triumphing over treachery. American victory legitimates
the rightness of American values. The American desire
to weave the barbarous terrorist assaults of September

11,2001,into the collective memory of
World War II is striking. September
11, many commentators urge, is "our"
Pearl Harbor. 1heirs is a facile effort
to capture the moral authority of the
"Good War" for our current "war on
terrorism" and to summon the same
sense of"moral clarity," national unity,
and democratic triumph characteristic of World War II (at least in our
collective memory of that war).
However, there is also a note of
rueful irony in the label of the "Good
War ." Not all memories of the war
emphasized
heroism, and some
individuals created alternative frameworks in which to put their memories
of it, ones which did not emphasize
triumph . In somewhat the same way,
many veterans of the First World War,
notably the famously alienated "lost
generation" of American writers, had
insisted on placing their memories
in a narrative of disillusionment and
despair, not triumph. For some, World
War II was not a lesson in "moral clarity" but one of moral failure . The war
was an instance of modern, industrial
warfare, in which whole societies were
mobilized to defeat an enemy. In the
process, nations developed new
and extraordinarily lethal weapons,
including the atomic bomb, used
against primarily civilian targets. The
distinction between combatant and
non-combatant slipped away, as the
entire populations became subject
to destructive warfare. In this narra tive, World War II, albeit fought by
the Allies in a noble and righteous
cause, reveals the partial collapse of
long-standing moral assumptions
about warfare and rules governing
its conduct. From this perspective, the
war brought humans to a moral crisis:
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Given the extraordinarily lethality of modern arms and
the ease with which modern states can deploy these arms
(now,in the twenty-first century, with the advantage of
computer technology, from remote locations and with
sometimes unprecedented accuracy), what moral and
ethical safeguards will guide the use of these weapons?
How can their destructive capacity be contained? Has
our technological capacity to destroy outrun our moral
capacity to regulate weapons of destruction?
The historian Michael C. C. Adams addresses this
point by attempting to puncture retrospective illusions
about World War II. The war, he argues, "has been converted over time from a complex, problematic event, full
of nuance and debatable meaning, to a simple, shining legend of the Good War." 28 In 1he Best /iVarEver:
America and World/iVarII (1994), the iconoclastic Adams
attempts to puncture every imaginable sort of myth surrounding the war. He highlights the incompetence and
callousness of some American commanders, recounting
the story, for example, of an experimental amphibious
vehicle, a tank designed to operate as a water craft, that
was deployed for use in the D-Day Normandy landings. The vehicles, each manned by American soldiers,
were lowered from a ship, one after the other, each
in succession sinking to the bottom of the sea, killing
their crews, with nobody calling a halt. 29 Most physical
casualties in the war, Adams reported, were not caused
by bullets; 85% were the result of bombs, shells, and
grenades, with death usually the result of a weapons
discharged from far away.30 There were 75,000 MIAs in
WWII-perhaps
many vaporized by high explosives.31
About 25-30% of all the casualties in the war were due
to mental fatigue, not physical injury; in especially
severe conditions, the percentage rose to 70-80%. On
Okinawa, for example, 7,613Americans died and 31,807
suffered physical wounds while an additional 26,221
were mental casualties. The rate of mental breakdowns
of men consistently in action for 28 days "ran as high
as 90 percent"; about 25% of the men still hospitalized
after the war were there for psychiatric reasons. 32
The brutality of the war is evident in E. B. Sledge's
particularly unvarnished account of his time in the
Marine Corps. He chronicles the hatred American
soldiers felt for their Japanese enemy and the ways in
which corpses were routinely desecrated and disfigured.

Moreover, he conveys the horror of the Pacific island
battlefields. On Peleliu, he recalled the huge, ever-present blowflies, attracted by decaying corpses, food, and
excrement, none of which could be buried in the rocky
surface of the volcanic island. "With human corpses,
human excrement, and rotting rations scattered across
Peleliu's ridges, those nasty insects were so large, so
glutted, and so lazy that some could scarcely fly,"Sledge
recalled. "They could not be waved away or frightened
off a can of rations or a chocolate bar. Frequently they
tumbled off the side of my canteen cup into my coffee.
We actually had to shake the food to dislodge the flies,
and even then they sometimes refused to move ... .It
was revolting, to say the least, to watch big fat blowflies
leave a corpse and swarm into our C rations. "33 Proud
of his service and of his nation, Sledge still nevertheless
lamented, "War is such self-defeating, organized madness the way it destroys a nation's best." 34 "As I looked
at the stains on the coral [Marine blood],"Sledge wrote,
"I recalled some of the eloquent phrases of politicians
and newsmen about how 'gallant' it is for a man to 'shed
his blood for his country,' and 'to give his life's blood
as a sacrifice,' and so on. The words seemed ridiculous.
Only the flies benefited." 35
America's current way of war-now
conducted
from air, sometimes with the use of remote-controlled,
pilot-less drones, and perhaps led by elite squads of
Special Forces troops operating independently and
covertly-may never again result in the same conditions
experienced by Sledge (at least for American troops).
But commentators after World War II also pondered
the implications of the new tactic of strategic bombing,
wherein civilians became subject to intensive and indiscriminate attacks from the air. Initiated on a massive
scale by the Allies in 1943, the indiscriminate slaughter
of civilians-up to 80,000 deaths in the March 9-10,
1945,firebombings ofTokyo, which included the use of
napalm-was an accepted and essentially unquestioned
mode of warfare well before the American decision to
use atomic weapons in Japan. 36 In the final months of
the war, as the U.S. sought to force a surrender from an
already defeated Japan, the American media featured a
seriousdiscussion of the potential use of chemical weapons to shorten the war. 37 ln August 1945, a Gallup poll
found that 85% of Americans approved of the use of the

atomic bomb, with newspapers almost
universally applauding its use.38
For some, the new technologies
of war were deeply troubling and
did not, on the surface, represent a
moral vindication of those who used
them. In the wake of the atomic
bomb, the liberal theologian Reinhold Niebuhr warned American
liberals of the danger of mixing the
"imperial power impulse"with "moral
idealism ."39 Americans are ignorant
and arrogant, he warned, citing the
letters of Paul, "Be not therefore
high-minded, but fear."40 The Leftist
critic Dwight Macdonald decried the
massive bombing on civilian populations because he felt that civilians
in an authoritarian nation cannot
be held morally responsible for that
nation's actions. There is no such thing
as collective responsibility, he argued.
He commented on the rationalized
and routinized character of modern
mass societies, in which the individual had increasingly less freedom
of action. Macdonald cited the words
of an unnamed 22-year-old lieutenant: "Whatever I tell you boils down
to this: I'm a cog in one hell of a big
machine. The more I think about it,
and I've thought about it a lot lately,
the more it looks as if I'd been a cog
in one thing after another since the
day I was born. Whenever I get set
to do what I want to do, something a
whole lot bigger than me comes along
and shoves me back into place. Its not
especially pleasant, but there it is."41
The conservative literary critic Marshall McLuhan felt that civilization
had not survived WWII. The atomic
bomb showed "the abdication of all
personal and individual character
from the political and economic
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spheres." 42 The war, conservative theorist Richard M.
Weaver observed, "is not going to improve anything.
We are going to get out of it poorer, more disillusioned,
more bankrupt in purpose than ever before .... The war
is like some giant automaton set going by an evil spirit.
Nobody thinks it is creating anything, nobody wants
it to go on, but nobody can stop it ."The dropping of
the bomb, he claimed, was "a final blow to the code of
humanity." 43
In many ways, World War II was a "Good War," a
war fought to defeat a regime that precisely embodied
the kind of amoral bureaucratization and rationalization of human life decried by critics such as Macdonald,
McLuhan, and Weaver. The dominant collective
memory of the war, created in so many different media,
reinforces this meaning. There are, however, a multiplicity of meanings, some etched in human memory, some
recoverable from the extant records. There is a seductive
quality to the concept of collective memory. For scholars,
it promises a new way to understand how cultures are
formed and societies are shaped. It unveils an entirely
new field in which to prospect for answers to puzzling
questions. So much of knowledge and culture is precisely
that which is remembered, after all.Memory also evokes
a more organic connection between people and their
civilization: In creating memory, we all can make a contribution; we all have power, simply due to our ability to
remember or forget. Memory may shape identity, it may
enable nationalism, it may repress trauma. However,
the fascinating possibilities of popular historymaking
and the seductive appeal of memory should not eclipse
the way in which knowledge and meaning are created.
Memories are only unlocked when they are shared. It
is the sharing, the exchange between a speaker and a
listener, that creates the histories. To make a history is
to insist on knowing the collective memory of an event
but also to discover and know all of the memories not
included in the dominant cultural memory. The historian searches out new memories indefatigably, writing
each one down, not only to get the record straight, but
also to acknowledge the responsibility upon the part of
the listener to interpret and analyze all memories and,
in this way, to assign moral meaning to the past.
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